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The U-2 spy plane played a vital role in the Cold War and other crises during the second half of 
the twentieth century. For a brief, but seminal period, it obtained intelligence that Presidents 
Eisenhower and Kennedy used to make wise decisions. Norman Polmar's Spyplane: The U-2 
History Declassified comes closer than any previous study to capturing the importance of this 
plane in waging the Cold War.  
Polmar sets out to provide as complete a history of the U-2 program as possible. At most levels, 
he succeeds. He opens with a brief introduction to early U.S. efforts to acquire aerial intelligence 
and describes the growing desire within the American government for a spy plane that could 
photograph the Soviet Union while remaining invulnerable to its defenses. The real strength of 
Polmar's discussion is his analysis of the technical development of the U-2 program. He provides 
the technical specifications of each version of the U-2 as well as descriptions of the camera 
equipment they carried. Additionally, he discusses the history of each U-2 flight.  
While the U-2's history is generally known, Polmar provides details that have never previously 
been disclosed. He shows how the CIA and Air Force used the U-2 to photograph numerous 
countries and concludes that these flights influenced U.S. policies by disproving the existence of 
bomber and missile gaps, revealing the presence of missile sites in Cuba, and clarifying activities 
in the Middle East. While this information is not new to the scholarly community, Polmar 
presents it in detail unseen before.  
For all of its strengths, Polmar's book suffers from a few problems. He sometimes glosses over 
analysis of the U-2's impact on decision makers. He argues "the overflights provided President 
Eisenhower and his advisors with unambiguous intelligence" (p. 3). From Eisenhower's 
perspective this was probably true, but many of his advisers remained unsure of Soviet 
capabilities. In reality, the U-2's coverage of the Soviet Union was limited. Polmar could have 
strengthened his arguments by more carefully examining the actual use of the U-2 intelligence. 
Furthermore, he accuses the CIA of misleading and lying to the president about the Soviet 
Union's ability to detect, track, and shoot down a U-2. While Polmar does show that the CIA 
sometimes gave the president inaccurate information, he is less convincing in arguing the 
deception was deliberate. His own evidence seems to indicate that the CIA did clarify the plane's 
vulnerability, as it became known.  
Despite these relatively minor shortcomings, Polmar's book is a major addition to our 
understanding of intelligence gathering during the Cold War. It definitely belongs on the 
bookshelf next to the works of William Burrows, Lawrence Freedman, John Prados, and Jeffrey 
Richelson.  
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